One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting by Thomas Schwartz
Public Choice (2011) 148: 197–214
DOI 10.1007/s11127-010-9652-3
One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting
Thomas Schwartz
Received: 18 September 2009 / Accepted: 16 April 2010 / Published online: 10 July 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its
median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on
evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible
legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and
except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as
well: observed votes can never refute and almost never confirm stability. One-dimensionality
fares worse: any legislative history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if it in-
cludes no two votes with overlapping pairs of alternatives, but otherwise, I show, it is almost
certainly incompatible with the model, even in those rare cases that ensure transitivity. Vot-
ing evidence aside, the one-dimensional model is unduly restrictive, and arguments in its
defense do not survive scrutiny.
Keywords Dimensionality · Single-peakedness · Legislatures · Voting
In legislative studies the one-dimensional model is so widely assumed, its median-stability
consequence so prominently exploited, that a visiting scholar from Mars (or a terrestrial
student new to the subject) would guess that stability and one-dimensionality rested on a
bounty of evidence drawn from observed votes. Alas they do not, as a matter of logic they
cannot, and as a matter of politics they had better not.
The one-dimensional model says that legislative alternatives can be ordered “left” to
“right” so that each legislator likes them less the farther they lie to the left of his favorite
or to its right. The model is prized for this consequence: At least one alternative—the me-
dian favorite—is stable, or unbeaten by any other, under majority rule. Model and conse-
quence play starring roles in some influential but diverse books on Congress (Rohde 1991;
Krehbiel 1998; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) and in article after article on legislative
T. Schwartz ()
Department of Political Science, UCLA, 4289 Bunche Hall, Box 951472, Los Angeles,
CA 90095-1472, USA
e-mail: tschwartz@polisci.ucla.edu
198 Public Choice (2011) 148: 197–214
behavior. The left-to-right ordering of legislators according to Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
NOMINATE scores, based on recorded votes, adds to the impression of empirical support.
After illustrating general conclusions with an example, then laying out the formal frame-
work of discussion, I prove that no possible history of legislative votes can reveal instabil-
ity, and except in very special circumstances that none can rule out instability either. Any
history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if no two of its votes have overlap-
ping pairs of alternatives. But if overlaps occur then violations of the model are not merely
possible: they are nigh inevitable, even in those very special circumstances where votes en-
sure stability. I follow these results by examining arguments against and for the model and
its consequence, concluding that one-dimensionality and stability are not only wanting in
empirical support but downright implausible. The model is commonly violated even when
Poole-Rosenthal NOMINATE scores reveal a single “dimension.” Appendix A recasts that
and other observations as methodological lessons.
1 Example
My results rest on an information gap: votes do not fully reveal preferences. To illustrate,
suppose a three-member legislative chamber takes two votes, each pitting one alternative
against another by majority rule, and we observe this:
At the first vote, z defeats x, with Reps. 2 and 3 voting for z, 1 for x.
At the second vote, y defeats z, with Reps. 1 and 2 voting for y, 3 for z.
Suppose too that Reps. 1, 2, and 3 are sincere (they vote for this rather than that only if they
prefer this to that) and their preferences are transitive. Then we can infer the following, but
no more, about those preferences:
Rep. 1 prefers both x and y to z.
Rep. 2 prefers y to z and both to x.
Rep. 3 prefers z to both x and y.
See the gap: we do not know 1 and 3’s preferences between x and y.
Thanks to that gap, our information is compatible with two profiles of individual pref-
erence orderings, both shown in Fig. 1. The corresponding relations of majority preference
are represented by arrows. One of them is transitive, the other cyclic. That makes y stable
in the one case: no majority prefers anything to y. But no alternative is stable in the other.
We can portray preferences graphically by listing alternatives along the horizontal axis
and interpreting the vertical axis as utility. The graphs in Fig. 1 capture the two profiles. In
the first, each utility curve is single peaked: it is always rising or always falling or rising
to a point and then falling. True, we can represent any preference with a single-peaked
curve by suitably ordering alternatives on the horizontal axis. What is important is that some
horizontal ordering makes all three curves single peaked at once. (Not every ordering does,
but that does not matter.) In the second graph, the displayed ordering (xyz) does not make
all three curves single peaked. Nor does any other ordering. We sum this up by saying of the
two profiles themselves that the one is single peaked, the other not.
The one-dimensional model says that the prevailing profile is single peaked. So the first
profile satisfies the model, but the observationally equivalent second one does not. In the
first case, stable y is the median of legislators’ favorites: no more than half of them have
their favorites (or peaks) on the left of y or on its right. That is generally true: when the
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Fig. 1 Observationally equivalent profiles, with majority preferences and utility curves
model is satisfied, median favorites and they alone are stable. Then, too, majority preference
is transitive, hence cycle free.
So at least in this simple case, one of two profiles is single peaked, a condition that
ensures stability, whereas the other creates a cycle, thereby blocking stability and single
peakedness, yet both are compatible with all one can observe from voting. In more elaborate
cases, too, observed votes are almost always compatible with both stability and instability,
though more rarely with single peakedness.
Objection: A third vote, between x and y, can close the information gap. If 1 votes for x
and 3 for y, the first profile is the actual one. If 1 and 3 vote for x, the second is.
Reply: But then a defeated alternative (x) appears again. That is so rare that we may
fairly assume it does not happen: it is hard enough to get anything on a real legislative
agenda. Lawson (2000) counts only about two successful motions “to reconsider” per year
in the U.S. Senate since WWII. And they had to reverse preceding votes, thereby changing
some revealed preferences instead of revealing new preferences that might close gaps. Yes,
a rejected amendment (a) to one bill (b1) might get attached to another bill (b2). But then the
rejected alternative (outcome) would not be a but b1 + a, and the new one would be b2 + a.
And yes, every successful bill defeats a default alternative, often the status quo, sometimes
a zero appropriation. But a successful bill also alters the content of the default alternative:
a later status quo or zero appropriation is a different alternative from the earlier, defeated one.
2 Formal framework
In substantive terms my discussion is about a legislative chamber of any size that chooses
between any number of alternatives two at a time by majority rule. As in the example,
assume that legislators are sincere, their preferences are transitive, no one abstains, there are
no tie votes, and defeated alternatives do not reappear.
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Formally, the advertised theorems treat of an integer n (number of legislators) and a set A
(of legislative alternatives). Let N = {1,2, . . . , n} and denote its members i, j , etc. Call a
subset of N a majority if it has more than n/2 members, a minority if it has fewer than n/2.
Call the members of A alternatives and denote them x, y, z, a, b, c, etc.
Individual preferences are represented by (strict linear) orderings of A, each a binary
relation on A (P ⊆ A2) that is asymmetric (never xPyPx), transitive (xPyPz =⇒ xPz),
and connected in A (x = y =⇒ xPy or yPx). Preference profiles are ordered n-tuples of
orderings of A, denoted P = (P1, . . . ,Pn), P ′ = (P ′1, . . . ,P ′n), etc. They determine relations
of majority preference, defined:
xM(P )y if and only if {i|xPiy} is a majority.
The findings to follow address four familiar conditions, three of them on M(P ):
TRANSITIVIY. If xM(P )yM(P )z then xM(P )z.
ACYCLICITY. Never x1M(P )x2M(P ) · · ·M(P )xrM(P )x1.
STABILITY. Every finite, nonempty subset of A has a member x such that yM(P )x
for no member y.
Obviously transitivity implies acyclicity, which is equivalent to stability. Black’s (1948,
1958) famous theorem is that all three conditions follow from a fourth, this one on P :
SINGLE PEAKEDNESS. There exists an ordering ≺ of A such that, for all i, x, y, z,
if xPiy and if z ≺ y ≺ x or x ≺ y ≺ z, then xPiz.
In fact, it follows that the x mentioned by Stability is the (or a) median, relative to ordering
≺ and indexing population N , of Pi -best members. Single Peakedness is the most general
and commonly cited version of one-dimensionality.1
To represent votes, define:
A vote history is any sequence ((W1, x1, y1), . . . , (Wh, xh, yh)), h ≥ 1, of ordered
triples (Wi,xi, yi) in which Wi is a majority, xi = yi , and yi is not among
xi+1, . . . , xh, yi+1, . . . , yh.
Let H = ((W1, x1, y1), . . . , (Wh, xh, yh)) denote an arbitrary history. Each (Wi,xi, yi) rep-
resents a vote in which xi defeats yi with Wi the winning majority: its members all vote for
xi , everyone else for yi (so no one abstains). The reason yi is banned from later occurrence
in the history is that losers do not reappear.
As we saw in Sect. 1, two consequentially different preference profiles might be compat-
ible with the same history of observed votes. Here is the general definition:
Profile P is compatible with history H if and only if, for all k = 1,2, . . . , h and all i
in N, i ∈ Wk ⇒ xkPiyk and i /∈ Wk ⇒ ykPixk .
1The original version, proffered by Hotelling (1929) and popularized by Downs (1957), strengthens single
peakedness by equating 	-ordered A with the real line (ordered by magnitude) and making individual utility
depend on distance from favorite points regardless of left or right direction. Single peakedness comes from
Black (1948), who couched it in terms of utility curves. My more abstract formulation comes from Arrow
(1963).
Infinite subsets of A need not have Pi -best members (legislators’ favorites). So if A is infinite we must
further assume that Pi -best members of A exist if we wish to deduce that a median of them is unbeaten in A
as a whole.
Although the most general version of one-dimensionality, single peakedness is not the most general re-
striction on preference-combinations that ensures stability (acyclicity). Scores of weaker restrictions have
been found over the years. The most general is Condorcet freedom (Schwartz 1986).
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An H -compatible P would include all preferences directly revealed by votes, so xkPiyk if i
voted for xk(i ∈ Wk) but ykPixk if not.
3 Two theorems: observed votes compatible with transitivity and cycles too
In Sect. 1 a two-vote history, although compatible with a cycle, was also compatible with
transitivity. So is every history:
Theorem 1 For every vote history H , some profile P compatible with H makes M(P ) an
ordering (hence transitive).
The majority preference may in fact be cyclic, but votes can never reveal that fact: acyclicity
is not falsifiable from votes. Appendix B has proofs of theorems.
The definition of “vote history” bans reconsideration: losing alternatives do not reappear.
That in turn bans directly revealed cycles: if x defeats y and is then defeated by z, y does not
reappear to defeat z. But those bans do not trivialize Theorem 1, because not every known
majority preference is directly revealed. Each is composed of individual preferences, but
some of those are inferred by transitivity from directly revealed preferences, and some of
the latter are revealed by minority votes. Not that such things are ever enough to complete a
cycle. But that has to be proved.
A famous kindred theorem is Szpilrajn’s (1930): every (strict) partial ordering of a set
(asymmetric, transitive) can be extended to an ordering (connected too). Some variants
(Duggan 1999) show that we can start with less than a partial ordering (not cyclic but not
transitive either). In effect Theorem 1 starts that way, with relations of revealed individual
preference, up to n of them. Those relations are finite, something Szpilrajn does not assume.
But Theorem 1 adds a wrinkle: we can not only extend those relations to full orderings but
do it in a way that makes majority preference an ordering too.
According to Theorem 1 we can never observe a cycle. But can we ever observe acyclic-
ity? Yes, in very special circumstances. Suppose n = 3, A = {x, y, z}, and we observe the
two-vote history (({1,2}, x, y), ({1,2}, z, x)): Reps. 1 and 2 (a majority) vote for x against
y, then for z against x. So they must prefer z to x to y and, therefore, z to y: majority
preference is transitive.
But any vote history of realistic length and internal diversity allows cycles. Take a his-
tory comprising three or more votes, none unanimous (if only because we have deleted the
unanimous ones). Suppose that either no winning alternative later loses (it keeps on winning
or stops appearing, for a while or for good) or else that does happen but in at least one such
case those legislators who vote for the winner and then against it (they are on the winning
side both times) are a minority. That history must allow cycles:
Theorem 2 Let H be any vote history in which h ≥ 3, no Wi is N , and either xi = yj for no
i, j , or else xi = yj for some i, j for which Wi ∩Wj is a minority. Then some P compatible
with H makes M(P ) cyclic.
To sum up, observed votes are always compatible with a transitive majority preference,
and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic one too.
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4 Two more theorems: observed votes always compatible with single peakedness
when issue pairs do not overlap, almost never when they do
Although every vote history is compatible with a transitive majority preference, transitivity
does not ensure single peakedness; it is rather single peakedness that ensures transitivity.
Is every history also compatible with single peakedness? No, but some are. It depends on
whether issue pairs—the pairs of alternatives compared at different votes—ever overlap.
Histories in which they never overlap are perforce compatible with single peakedness—
and, I may as well add, with the violation of single peakedness, too, so long as there exist at
least three alternatives and one nonunanimous vote:
Theorem 3 Let H be any vote history in which xj = xi = yj whenever i < j . Then (a)
some H -compatible profile is single peaked, and (b) provided |A| ≥ 3 and some Wj is not
N , some other H -compatible profile is not single peaked.
Given the trifling provisos of (b), when issue pairs do not overlap, votes tell us nothing one
way or the other about one-dimensionality.
The ban on overlapping issue pairs is highly restrictive, of course. What if we allow some
overlap? Then single peakedness is still a possibility, but now only barely. For n = 3 the two-
vote history (({1,2}, x, y), ({1,2}, z, x)), with overlap x, allows and even guarantees single
peakedness. But it represents a special case: besides only two votes, it has one majority
({1,2}) on the winning side twice, both times all by itself.
By contrast, take any history that has some overlapping issue pairs and at least this much
variation in winning sides: in some case of overlap, at least one legislator is on the winning
side of either vote but not the other, and at least one is on the losing side both times. That is
enough to block single peakedness:
Theorem 4 Let H have components (Wi,xi, yi) and (Wj,xj , yj ) that share an alternative,
and suppose that Wi − Wj,Wj − Wi , and N − (Wi ∪ Wj) are nonempty. Then no profile
compatible with H can be single peaked.
To the importance of this theorem one might object that H can fall just a few votes short of
compatibility with single peakedness. But in a legislature a few votes can be pivotal.
See what Theorem 4 adds to Theorem 2. When the hypothesis of Theorem 2 is satisfied,
the observed votes merely allow a cycle, and with it a violation of single peakedness. But
when the hypothesis of Theorem 4 is satisfied, the observed votes compel a violation of
single peakedness (though not a cycle, thanks to Theorem 1). This can happen even in those
rare circumstances that ensure transitivity. Suppose we have a two-vote history ((W1, x1, y1),
(W2, x2, y2)) with overlapping issue pairs and a majority, W , that is on the winning side
both times. So x1 = x2 or x1 = y2,W is a subset of both W1 and W2, and transitivity is
guaranteed. But so long as some legislator allies with W only on the first vote, another only
on the second, and a third neither time, the hypothesis of Theorem 4 is satisfied and single
peakedness is blocked.
5 Arguments against
Votes are not the whole story, of course, but when we examine some of the richer stories that
stability and one-dimensionality rule out, those assumptions appear implausibly restrictive.
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Fig. 2 Indifference maps
In showing this I shall traverse some familiar territory, but my route is partly new, and certain
details of the topography are needed later, to report and refute the positive arguments of the
next section.
By strengthening single peakedness one way, then relaxing it another, we arrive at the
general spatial model of voting,2 variously employed by critics as well as defenders of sta-
bility and one-dimensionality. The strengthening assumes that the feasible alternatives are
all the points on a line, where each legislator has a favorite and likes other points less the
farther they lie to its left or to its right. From now on let there be one median favorite (guar-
anteed if n is odd). Besides being unbeaten, Black (1948, 1958) showed, it beats every other
point. Proof : Legislators whose favorite points are at or left (right) of the median are a
majority, and they prefer it to every point on its right (left).
For relaxation we let the feasible alternatives be all the points in a Euclidean space of one
or more dimensions, and if more than one we give every legislator i an indifference map.
It consists of a favorite point Vi girt by indifference contours, infinitely many of them, so
many so placed that every point lies on one and only one. Figure 2 is a partial picture of some
indifference maps in two dimensions. Indifference contours are circles, ellipses, and other
shapes, in general the boundaries of strictly convex sets. A legislator is indifferent between
points (x, y) on the same contour and prefers points (x, y again) on higher (inner) contours
to ones (z) on lower (outer) contours. So Rep. 4 prefers y to z although z is closer to V4.
Only a legislator who, like Rep. 1, has circular (spheroidal) indifference contours always
likes points less the farther they lie from his favorite, regardless of direction; only such a
legislator, we say, has Euclidean preferences.
Now assume two or more dimensions, and take any line L. Besides a favorite point in the
space, each legislator i has a favorite point on L—if not Vi then the point where one of i’s
indifference contours is tangent to L—and he likes other points less the farther they lie to its
left or to its right. In Fig. 3, for example, Rep. 1 prefers V1 to x to y to z to w, Rep. 2 prefers
y (his favorite on L) to x to V1 and also to z to w, etc. We may invoke Black’s stability
theorem and conclude that the median favorite on L beats every other point on L. But that
result is now an instability theorem. If a point x on L is not the median on L then x must
2From Black and Newing (1951), generalized by Davis and Hinich (1966) and Plott (1967).
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Fig. 3 Favorite points on any line
be unstable: the median on L beats x. So the only way x can be stable in the whole space is
by being a 360° median, a median on every line through x. That is an extraordinarily tough
requirement: so perfectly balanced are legislators’ indifference maps that, however much
we rotate a line at x, we shall never find the favorite (tangency) points of more than n/2
legislators on either side of x.3
Of course one might question the general spatial model, especially its assumption that the
feasible alternatives are the uncountable infinitude of points in a Euclidean space; I would.
But if we start with that model we find that Black’s theorem is two edged: precisely by
ensuring stability in one dimension it all but precludes stability in more dimensions. This
does not gainsay one-dimensionality. It does show that the number one is critical: once we
assume two or more dimensions we not only lose the guarantee of stability but buy a near
guarantee of instability. For that reason the one-dimensional model cannot be rationalized,
with an epistemological shrug, as a simplification or abstraction or reduced form, got by
uncluttering one explanatory factor. Its champions must argue that the number of dimensions
really is exactly one, or that a plurality of dimensions can be effectively reduced to one.
I examine some such arguments in the next section.
For a less fanciful way to appreciate how restrictive acyclicity and single-peakedness
are, imagine two legislative measures, a and b, each designed to benefit some minority at
every one else’s expense. Suppose the two minorities share no members but together make
a majority, and there are mutual gains from trade: both minorities prefer the passage of
both measures (ab) to the defeat of both (ab). Then legislators must have the following
preferences:
3Assuming the general spatial model with two or more dimensions, the near impossibility of a stable point—
the extreme severity of a necessary condition for stability—was discovered by Plott (1967). His theorem
is more dramatic but harder to prove than mine about a 360° median, which is more reminiscent of Cox’s
(1987). Its equivalence to Black’s old theorem is new.
Assuming that x is the favorite point of at most one legislator, Plott’s necessary condition for the stability
of x is pairwise symmetry: legislators whose favorite points are not x can be paired one-to-one so that each
has an indifference contour convex and tangent to his mate’s at x (i.e., x is on their contract curve). It is not
too hard to see that if x is not pairwise symmetric but is the median tangency point on some line L then an
arbitrarily small rotation of L at x in some plane destroys x’s medianhood on the rotated line, proving thereby
x’s instability (since it cannot be a 360° median) and therewith Plott’s theorem.
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Minority 1 prefers ab to ab to ab to ab.
Minority 2 prefers ab to ab to ab to ab.
Everyone else prefers ab to ab and ab and both to ab.
These are exactly the preferences needed for a vote trade. If both measures are voted on
independently, both fail: the outcome is ab, the status quo. But if the two minorities trade
votes, Minority 1 supporting b in return for 2’s support of a, then both measures pass: the
outcome is ab, which the majority of minorities prefers to ab. But this apparently common
scenario has created a cycle: majorities prefer ab to ab to ab back to ab—also ab to ab to
ab to ab.
Explicit vote trades are not needed. We can think of ab as a single bill written to please
both minorities. If we like we can imagine that this bill contains, besides a and b, some
broadly appealing provisions not decomposable into minority benefits: let ab be the package
of those provisions rather than the status quo, and suppose most legislators prefer ab to the
actual status quo. We can also allow shared members: they prefer ab to ab and ab, and all
three to ab. And instead of two large minorities we can of course concoct similar examples
with three or more smaller minorities. Any bill or package of bills fits the pattern if it benefits
a majority of minorities, each at everyone else’s expense.4 I think you will agree that a great
deal of legislation is like that.
This story opens the door to evidence of a sort, but by Theorem 1 it cannot consist solely
of votes. Shared members aside, the preferences that make up the cycle include Minority 1’s
preference for b over b regardless of a. But if the two minorities trade votes then Minority
1 will not reveal that preference: it will vote for b against b. Or if ab is a single bill then
Minority 1 would, if similarly cooperative, support ab against any amendment to strike b.
Evidence for the cycle can be found, not by observing votes, but by unraveling ab into com-
ponent measures, then following the money to see which constituencies and other groups
tied to Reps. 1,2, . . . , n stand to benefit from which of those measures.
6 Arguments for
Naturally there are arguments on the other side, not all of them explicit: the one-dimensional
model is often assumed, rarely defended. But the arguments below rest on familiar premises
and probably account for much of the model’s appeal.
One argument allows multiple dimensions but hypothesizes that they amount to one be-
cause monotonically related: if Rep. i’s favorite point in one dimension is right of Rep. j ’s
then that is true in all dimensions. Equivalently: each legislator is ideologically consistent.
Enelow and Hinich (1984: 38ff.) make much the same point, stochastically qualified, by hy-
pothesizing an underlying “predictive dimension.” It is supposed to follow that we can treat
any of those dimensions as the sole one and that the vector of dimensional medians is stable.
But suppose n = 3, the dimensions are two, and preferences are Euclidean. Then the
fancied monotonicity is consistent with both graphs in Fig. 4. The first is linear, and median
V2 beats every other point in the space. But linearity is an extraordinarily special case of
monotonicity (itself a strong assumption). The second graph is much more likely. There V2,
the vector of dimensional medians, is not stable: x is closer than V2 to V1 and V3, so Reps.
1 and 3 (a majority) prefer x to V2. (Not that x is stable either: y beats it.)
4The connection between majorities of minorities and instability was found by Downs (1957: 54–60), then
successively generalized by Kadane (1972), Bernholz (1973), Schwartz (1977), and Schwartz (1981).
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Fig. 4 Monotonically related dimensions
The best-known defense of the one-dimensional model begins with a concession: let there
be several dimensions, representing as many policy issues. But suppose legislators vote one
dimension at a time. Then we may as well assume one-dimensionality because every contest
among rival measures fits that assumption. To justify the hypothesis that legislators vote one
dimension at a time, Shepsle (1979) and Shepsle and Weingast (1981), focusing on the U.S.
House of Representatives, famously contend that the jurisdiction of each legislative com-
mittee is one-dimensional, that every floor contest among rival measures pits a committee
report against amended variants, and that a germaneness requirement squeezes all recog-
nizable amendments into the same one-dimensional committee jurisdiction as the reported
bill. As these authors point out, we must assume as well that committee jurisdictions are not
linked by vote trades or complementary preferences.
But how plausible is it that committee jurisdictions fit single dimensions? Typical bills
are nothing like points on a line. They are book-length compendia of services, handouts,
penalties, contingencies, mandates, restrictions, and procedures, each burdening or benefit-
ing this or that group, often a minority. General-interest legislation (e.g., national defense)
is larded with minority benefits (bases, procurements). Even when not explicitly porcine,
domestic spending is based on formulas finely tuneable to favor one or another minority
(school construction, water and sewage plants, farm subsidies). The U.S. tax code would
take up a pamphlet, not a small library, but for countless minority subsidies and exemp-
tions. Our package measure ab was if anything a gross oversimplification yet already com-
plex enough to block one-dimensionality and even stability. To add some substance to that
schematic story, interpret a as agricultural price supports, b as food stamps, and Minori-
ties 1 and 2 as representatives of rural and urban Congressional districts, and you have the
Agriculture Act of 1977. Well aware of the instability, floor leaders protected ab against
majority-preferred amendments by lining up counter-amendments to threaten their sponsors
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1988).
The one-dimensional model appears to gain plausibility from the way we talk about
politicians. We have no trouble placing them in left-to-right order, and for Congress ADA
scores do that with a certain precision. But all this shows is that each legislator has an
ideological average, reckoned from his votes on conspicuously ideological issues. That is
necessarily true, however he and others vote.
A particularly interesting source of potential support for the one-dimensional model is
the successful left-to-right ordering of legislators according to the NOMINATE scores of
Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1997). Their method fits a single scale, or factor, to the bulk
of congressional voting (not quite all of it). It thereby encodes the probability of any two
legislators voting alike using indices assigned to single legislators rather than pairs of them:
the closer your index is to mine, the more frequently we vote the same way. But for all its
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predictive power and beauty the NOMINATE ordering is not necessarily the left-to-right
ordering required by single peakedness (the one-dimensional model).
To see why, suppose x defeats y, then z defeats x, with majority MAJ voting for x then
z, minority MIN voting the opposite way both times, and swing legislator SW voting with
MIN for y then with MAJ for z. Here are the revealed preferences:
MAJ prefers z to x to y.
SW prefers z and y to x.
MIN prefers y to x to z.
Obviously majority preference is transitive. By the Poole-Rosenthal method, the first vote
divides N into MAJ and MIN +SW , the second into MAJ +SW and MIN, together requiring
the left-to-right ordering MAJ − SW − MIN—or the reverse. Even so, single peakedness is
already violated. If we order the three alternatives xyz (or the reverse), then MAJ ends up
with a preference curve that is not single peaked, likewise MIN with yxz, and likewise SW
with xzy.
The lesson is quite general:—To order legislators from left to right is one thing, often an
easy thing. To order both legislators and alternatives, as required by single peakedness, is
something else, often an impossibility. In the example the ordering of legislators was simple
and uncontroversial, but we could not mesh it with any ordering of alternatives. Why has this
not been appreciated? Because, I believe, most scholars who work with legislative votes do
not look for overlaps between issue pairs (hard to discern from roll-call reports), but without
them single peakedness cannot be falsified, says Theorem 3.
7 Conclusion
Its simplicity and fruitfulness make the one-dimensional model valuable as a source of ex-
amples of what can happen and of insights that invite generalization. Take the celebrated
“setter” model of Romer and Rosenthal (1978).5 It starts with Hotelling’s (1929) strong
version of one-dimensionality: alternatives are all the points on a line, and each legislator
likes them less the farther they lie from his favorite, regardless of left or right direction. If
proposals are considered under a closed rule (no amendments), and if the default alternative
lies far to one side of the median favorite point, then a successful proposal can lie almost
as far to the other side. Here one-dimensionality makes things vivid, but it is not essential
to the lessons (1) that the less popular the default alternative (by any or many measures),
the greater the range of legislation that can pass under a closed rule, and (2) that a take-it-
or-leave-it agenda setter can be surprisingly influential although someone else has the last
word. More dimensions would, if anything, magnify these lessons, only the graphics would
be harder to visualize and explain.
But as a general hypothesis about legislative behavior, neither the one-dimensional model
nor its stability consequence rests, or can rest, on the evidence of votes. Observed votes can
never refute stability (or acyclicity), can almost never confirm stability, can never confirm
or refute one-dimensionality (or single peakedness) if issue pairs do not overlap at all, but
almost always do refute one-dimensionality if they overlap even a bit. Moreover, to affirm
stability or one-dimensionality within any legislative context, one must be prepared to affirm
that successful legislation in that context never benefits a majority of minorities, each at
everyone else’s expense.
5It is too bad those authors do not have Celtic names, else we could speak of the Irish setter model.
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It is no good protesting that sound science relies on “maintained assumptions,” not tested
and confirmed every time they are used. Stability is not even testable from observed votes
except in very special circumstances, and the one-dimensional model, although more often
testable, is most often refuted. It is no good protesting that some assumptions are, like eco-
nomic rationality, hard to test but plausible enough to wrap inside readily tested models. Sta-
bility and one-dimensionality are not that plausible; they are not plausible at all in a world,
such as the real one, where legislation sometimes benefits majorities of minorities. It is no
good protesting that the one-dimensional model is not essential anyway to the observational
generalizations explained thereby. Empirical explananda never necessitate their theoretical
explanantia. It is no good protesting that simple, fruitful models have to fit the evidence
only approximately and then only after outliers have been purged. What we found is not that
stability and one-dimensionality fit observed votes poorly but that stability fits too well—it
cannot be falsified—and one-dimensionality hardly at all. And it is no good protesting that
models based on one-dimensionality are nothing more than elaborate examples. Then one
should have said so and said what they exemplify.
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Appendix A: Methodological warnings
These eight warnings are practical lessons from social choice theory for legislative studies.
Each treats only of common or typical cases, ignoring possible but outré exceptions.
1. Do not try to infer stability or instability, cycles or acyclicity, from a vote history that
reports votes between alternatives but says nothing about the content of those alternatives.
2. When a legislative history reports overlapping issue pairs, expect a violation of single
peakedness.
3. When it does not, expect to find no violation but also no positive evidence of single
peakedness.
4. When a legislative alternative would benefit a majority of minorities, each at everyone
else’s expense, expect to find that it is unstable: a majority prefer another alternative to
it.
5. In the multi-dimensional spatial model of voting, even if preferences are Euclidean and
the dimensions are monotonically related (legislators’ ideal points line up the same way
in all dimensions), do not expect stability or single peakedness to hold. Those properties
are satisfied only if the dimensions are linearly related. Linearity is a very special case of
monotonicity.
6. When a germaneness rule limits legislative voting on a bill and amended variants to a sin-
gle “subject” or committee jurisdiction, that obviously limits the number of dimensions
of the alternatives on the floor. But do not expect it to reduce that number to one. And
unless it does, do not expect it to ensure stability (or acyclicity) among those alternatives.
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7. Shepsle and Weingast cited germaneness only as an example of a procedural rule that
can help secure stability—as a “structure” that can “induce equilibrium.” But whether
procedural rules have that effect depends on what kind of “stability” one has in mind. The
creature of majority-preference cycles, an alternative’s latent instability is the preference
by a majority for another alternative; its manifest instability is its actual rejection in a
vote in favor of another alternative. The 1977 Agriculture Act was latently unstable, as I
explained, but it was manifestly stable: it endured for four years, and in outline it passed
again in 1981. Obviously procedural rules contribute to manifest stability, e.g., by making
it hard to reconsider a bill once passed. But single peakedness and Theorems 1 and 2 have
to do only with latent stability, which cycles block. Do not confuse the two.
8. Sound methods of dimensional analysis for roll-call votes, such as Poole-Rosenthal
NOMINATE scoring, demonstrably achieve their advertised purpose of matching prox-
imity between legislators with the probability of their voting alike. But do not expect
the dimensions found thereby to serve other purposes (Koford 1989), and when those
dimensions turn out to be one in number, do not infer single peakedness.
Appendix B: Proofs
To prove Theorems 1–4 we shall need four more definitions and three lemmata. Define:
z defeats w in H iff (z,w) = (xi, yi) for some i ≤ h.
DHz = the least set containing z and containing everything defeated in H by any
member.
Lemma 1 Each thing is defeated in H by at most one thing.
Proof Otherwise, some yi would be defeated in H by xi , then by some other xj , so that
yi = yj though i < j , contrary to the definition of “history.” 
Lemma 2 In H , no member of DHZ defeats any nonmember, and no nonmember defeats any
member but z.
Proof Everything defeated by a member is itself a member, so a member cannot defeat a
nonmember. Also every member but z is defeated by another member, so by Lemma 1 it
cannot be defeated by a nonmember. 
Now define:
z is compared with w in H iff z defeats w or w defeats z in H .
If P is an ordering of A and X ⊆ A, let [XP ] be the permutation of P got by moving
the P -ordering of X above that of A−X, and [PX] the permutation got by moving the
P -ordering of X below that of A−X. Further let [xP ] = [{x}P ] and [Px] = [P {x}].
Lemma 3 Suppose P is compatible with H . Take any z and i ≤ h. If nothing below z in Pi
defeats z, then permuting Pi to [PiDHz ] preserves H -compatibility. And if nothing above z
in Pi defeats z, then permuting Pi to [DHz Pi] preserves H -compatibility.
Proof By construction and Lemma 2, the relative positions of any two alternatives in Pi
are changed by the given permutations only if those alternatives are never compared in H .
Therefore, such changes must preserve H -compatibility. 
210 Public Choice (2011) 148: 197–214
Theorem 1 For every H , some H -compatible P makes M(P ) an ordering of A.
Proof By induction on h.
Suppose h = 1, so that H = ((W1, x1, y1)). Let R1 be any ordering of A with x1 at top,
and R1 the same but with x1 at bottom. Let Pi = R1 whenever i ∈ W1, and Pi = R1 whenever
i /∈ W1. Then obviously P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) is H -compatible. And because W1 is a majority,
M(P ) is the ordering R1.
Now suppose h > 1 and the theorem holds for H ′ = ((W1, x1, y1), . . . , ((Wh−1, xh−1,
yh−1)): some P compatible with H ′ makes M(P ) an ordering. Let:
P ∗i =
{
[DH ′xh Pi] if i ∈ Wh
[PiDH ′xh ] otherwise, i = 1,2, . . . , n.
By definition of “history,” xh differs from every yi , so nothing defeats xh in H ′. Therefore,
P ∗ = (P ∗1 , . . . ,P ∗n ) is, like P ,H ′-compatible by Lemma 2. Also nothing defeats yh in H ′,
so yh /∈ DH ′xh . Consequently, in every P ∗i , xh is above yh if i ∈ Wh but below yh otherwise.
Hence P ∗ is H -compatible too. Moreover, because M(P ) is an ordering and Wh is a ma-
jority, M(P ∗) is the permuted ordering [DH ′xh M(P )]. 
Theorem 2 Let H be any history with h ≥ 3,Wi = N∀i, and either xi = xj for no i, j , or
else xj = yk for some j, k for which Wj ∩ Wk is a minority. Then some P compatible with
H makes M(P ) cyclic.
Proof Some P is compatible with H by Theorem 1. Two main cases.
Case 1. xi = yj for no i, j : no xi is defeated in H . Two subcases.
Subcase 1.1. xi = xj for all j . Then x1 defeats y1, y2, y3. To aid readability, rewrite
x1, y1, y2, y3 as x, a, b, c, respectively. So x defeats a, b, and c.
In each Pi, x is either above a, b, and c, below all three, or above only a, only b, only c,
only a and b, only a and c, or only b and c. But the cases where x is above only a or above
only a and c are all cases where x is below b and above a. Two other pairs of cases can be
likewise combined. As a result, N can be partitioned into these five sets:
Sac = {i|x is below a and above c in Pi} ,
Sba = {i|x is below b and above a in Pi} ,
Scb = {i|x is below c and above b in Pi} ,
Sabc = {i|x is below a, b, c in Pi} ,
Sabc = {i|x is above a, b, c in Pi} .
Because x defeats a (in H ), there exists a majority W with x above a in Pi for all i in
W . But x is below a in Pi for every i in Sac . Therefore, Sac is a minority. So likewise are Sba
and Scb ∪ Sabc .
Now partition Sabcinto subsets S1abc, S2abc , and S3abc (possibly empty in one or more cases)
so that S1abc ∪ Sac , S2abc ∪ Sba , and S3abc ∪ Scb ∪ Sabc are still minorities. But these three sets
partition N . So any two of them make a majority.
Because x defeats a, nothing else can defeat a by Lemma 1, and because x = x1, a = y1
can defeat nothing. So a is comparable only to x. Therefore, H -compatibility is preserved
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if we move a to the top of any Pi in which aPix or to the bottom of any Pi in which xPia.
Likewise b and c. Hence, the following permutations preserve H -compatibility:
Pi to P ′i = [[aPi] c] if i ∈ Sac ,
Pi to P ′i = [[bPi]a] if i ∈ Sba ,
Pi to P ′i = [[cPi]b] if i ∈ Scb,
Pi to P ′i = [c [a [bPi]]] if i ∈ Sabc,
Pi to P ′i = [[[Pia]b] c] if i ∈ S1abc,
Pi to P ′i = [[[Pib] c]a] if i ∈ S2abc,




i c if i ∈ S1abc ∪ Sac ,
bP ′i cP
′
i a if i ∈ S2abc ∪ Sba , and
cP ′i aP
′
i b if i ∈ S3abc ∪ Scb ∪ Sabc.
Because any two of those subsets make a majority we have aM(P ′)bM(P ′)cM(P ′)a. So
H -compatible P ′ makes M(P ′) cyclic.
Subcase 1.2. x1 = xj for some j . Then there must exit j < h such that xj occurs in no
triple beyond (Wj,xj , yj ). Because Wj = N , we can partition Wj into minorities W 1j and
W 2j . To aid readability, rewrite xj , yj , xj+1 as x, y, z, respectively.
By hypothesis of the case, nothing defeats z (in H ). So compatibility is preserved, by
Lemma 3, if we permute any Pi to [DHz Pi] or [PiDHz ]. Again by hypothesis of the case,
because x defeats y, y cannot defeat anything, and by Lemma 1 nothing else defeats y. So
y is comparable to naught but x. However, y is above x in every Pi with i ∈ N − Wj . So
compatibility is preserved when any such Pi is permuted to [yPi]. Hence, the following
permutations preserve compatibility:




if i ∈ W 1j ,






if i ∈ W 2j , and






if i ∈ N − W.
But now we have:
zP ′i xP
′
i y for all i ∈ W 1j ,
xP ′i yP
′
i z for all i ∈ W 2j , and
yP ′i zP
′
i x for all i ∈ N − W.
Because {W 1j ,W 2j ,N −W } is a partition of N into three minorities, any two of which make
a majority, we further have xM(P ′)yM(P ′)zM(P ′)x—a cycle.
Case 2. xj = yk for some j, k for which Wj ∩ Wk is a minority. It follows from the
definition of “history” that j < k. Let us relable xj , yj , xk as x, y, z, respectively. So x
defeats y (at the j th triple) and z defeats x (at the kth).
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Because P is H -compatible, we have, for all i:
xPiy and xPiz if i ∈ Wj − Wk, (1)
zPixPiy if i ∈ Wj ∩ Wk, (2)
yPix and zPix if i ∈ Wk − Wj, and (3)
yPixPiz if i ∈ N − (Wj ∪ Wk). (4)
Because x = yk but an alternative once defeated does not recur in any triple, every mem-
ber of BHx besides x is defeated before the kth triple (it is defeated in ((W1, x1, y1), . . . ,
(Wk−1, xk−1, yk−1))) and thus cannot appear in the kth triple, (Wk,xk, yk). So z = yk /∈ BHx .
Likewise z /∈ BHy .
But because x defeats y, y ∈ BHx . So if we permute Pi to [BHx Pi] whenever i ∈ Wj −Wk ,
we have x above y above z in the permuted ordering. And because, by (1), x was already
above z, which defeats x, the permutation preserves H -compatibility thanks to Lemma 3.
Similarly, if we permute Pi to [BHx Pi] whenever i ∈ Wk − Wj , we have y above z above
x by (3), and H -compatibility is preserved by Lemma 3.
Now change P to P ′ by effecting those two permutations. Then P ′ is H -compatible.
But now we have:
xP ′i y for every i ∈ Wj,
zP ′i x for every i ∈ Wk, and
yP ′i z for every i ∈ N − (Wj ∩ Wk).
But Wj ∩ Wk is a minority by hypothesis of the case, making N − (Wj ∩ Wk) a majority, as
are Wj and Wk . Hence xM(P ′)yM(P ′)zM(P ′)x, another cycle. 
Theorem 3 Let H be such that xj = xi = yj whenever i < j . Then (a) some H -compatible
P is single peaked, and (b) provided |A| ≥ 3 and Wj = N for some j , some H -compatible
P is not single peaked.
Proof (a) Let R be any ordering of N −{x1, . . . , xh, y1, . . . , yh}. Construct P so that, for all
i, xkPiyk if i ∈ Wk,ykPixk if i /∈ Wk , and Pi has x1 and y1 above x2 and y2, the latter above
x3 and y3, etc., with R below all of them. Then P is compatible with H . Now construct ≺
so that
xh ≺ xh−1 ≺ · · · ≺ x1 ≺ y1 ≺ y2 ≺ · · · ≺ yh
with R again below all the xj , yj . Then
aPib ⇒ aPic whenever c ≺ b ≺ a or a ≺ b ≺ c.
So P is single peaked.
(b) By hypothesis, nothing defeats any xi in H . Because Wj = N we can partition Wj
into two minorities, W 1j and W 2j . Let x = xj , y = yj . If h > 1 let z = xi for some i = j , and
if h = 1 let z ∈ A − {x, y} (possible because |A| ≥ 3). Either way, nothing defeats z in H ,
and the argument of Subcase 1.2 in the previous proof goes through. So some P compatible
with H makes M(P ) cyclic, hence not single peaked. 
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Theorem 4 If components (Wj,xj , yj ) and (Wk,xk, yk) of H share an alternative, and if
Wj −Wk,Wk −Wj , and N − (Wj ∪Wk) are nonempty, and if P is compatible with H , then
P cannot be single peaked.
Proof Let q ∈ Wj − Wk, r ∈ Wk − Wj , and s ∈ N − (Wj ∩ Wk). Because Wj and Wk are
majorities, we may further let t ∈ Wj ∩ Wk . Because Wj − Wk = φ, j = k; say j < k. Then
yj cannot occur in (xk, yk). So xj does, and there are two cases to consider.
Case 1. xj = xk . But xjPiyj for all i ∈ Wj whereas yjPixj for all i ∈ N − Wj . Also
xk = xjPiyk for all i ∈ Wk whereas ykPixj = xk for all i ∈ N − Wk . So:
ykPqxjPqyj , xjPtyj &xjPtyk, yjPrxjPryk, and yjPsxj &ykPsxj .
But then P flouts single peakedness. For example, if the ≺-ordering has xj ≺ yj ≺ yk then
obviously Pq does not fit. It is a routine matter to check the other possible ≺-orderings.
Case 2. xj = yk . As before, xjPiyj for all i ∈ Wj whereas yjPixj for all i ∈ N −Wj . But
now xkPixj = yk for all i ∈ Wk whereas yk = xjPixk for all i ∈ N − Wk . So:
xjPqyj &xjPqxk, xkPtxjPtyj , xkPrxj &yjPrxj , and yjPsxjPsxk.
This again is enough to bar some P -ordering from fitting any given ≺-ordering. 
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